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Abstract: 
A theoretical model is used to explore the determinants of the optimum size of a private research park and the 
effect of university affiliation on that optimum size. Parks are assumed to operate as cooperatives where costs 
are equally shared among the member firms, and optimality occurs when the firms‟ average net benefits are 
maximized. To achieve this, existing members of a park will limit the park‟s size, denying entry to firms who 
wish to join and are willing to share the costs. University affiliation may either increase or decrease the 
optimum size of a park. 
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Article: 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Research parks can have a significant impact on commercial research and development activities and are an 
important component of a nation‟s innovation system.
1
 By providing a venue for research firms and 
organizations to operate in close proximity, they enable easier communication among professionals in different 
organizations, enhancing the research productivity of all of them. They enable communities to leverage 
technology-based growth into economic development, and they facilitate advancement through the stages of 
technology-based economic activity by reducing relevant market transactions especially with respect to 
technical labor.
2
 These benefits have made the development of research parks a goal of public policy in the 
United States and in other countries. On July 22, 2004, Senator Bingaman introduced a Bill, S. 2737, „The 
Science Park Administration Act of 2004,‟ to facilitate the development of science parks. The premise on which 
the Bill was based is: „It is in the best interests of the Nation to encourage the formation of science parks to 
promote the clustering of innovation through high technology activities.‟ Building on the premise of S. 2737, 
Senator Pryor introduced on May 11, 2007 a Bill, S. 1373, the „Building a Stronger America Act.‟ S. 1373 
provides grants and loan guarantees for the development and construction of science parks to promote the 
clustering of innovation through high technology activities. As of 2002, the United States had 81 parks 
operating with approximately 30 additional planned. University involvement in creating and managing research 
parks is widespread but not universal.
3
 
 
Their importance highlights the needs for more knowledge about how science parks „work,‟ who locates within 
a park and why, and the scope of leverage that parks provide tenants and the region where they are located. In 
the United States, at least, park formation is growing and gaining increased public policy attention. Leyden, 
Link and Siegel (2008) have provided an initial theoretical examination of why a firm locates in a university 
research park. This paper examines the issue of what determines the size of a research park and how that size is 
effected by the presence (or absence) of university involvement. Given the importance of research parks, the 
issue of their size and of the impact of university involvement on that size is relevant to issues of efficient 
allocation of economic resources. 
2 THE MODEL 
The model of the research park developed in this paper is based on the economic theory of clubs. See Sandler 
and Tschirhart (1980) for a survey of this literature. For members of a private research park, the value of 
belonging to the park is the opportunity it affords to engage in synergistic R&D activities that can increase the 
members‟ profits. There are also, of course, costs of establishing and operating a research park. We assume 
these costs are shared equally among the members. The objective of a private research park, we assume, is to 
maximize the average net benefit of the park members. Average net benefit (ANB) is defined to be total R&D 
benefits to members of the park divided by the number of member firms (AB) minus the average (per firm) cost 
of establishing and operating the research park (AC). Both the average benefit from joining the park and the 
average cost of running the park will depend on the number of firms who join the park, N. 
 
For the range of park members around the optimal level, diminishing marginal returns would ensure that the 
average benefits curve from R&D is declining. Initially, the marginal benefit exceeds the average benefit, 
causing average benefit to increase with increasing park membership. Each new member‟s contribution to 
marginal benefit is lower than that of the previous member, and marginal benefit eventually falls below average 
benefit, causing the average benefit of adding new members to fall (Figs. 1 and 2). Average benefit may 
eventually become asymptotic to some value (possibly zero), but this will occur after average benefit is 
maximized. Average benefit from R&D collaboration is thus assumed to be a strictly quasiconcave function of 
N. AB reaches a peak value at N =    and then steadily diminishes thereafter: 
 
The total costs of the research park are composed of a fixed component F, consisting of installation and 
maintenance of basic infrastructure, administrative overhead, etc., and a variable component VC consisting of 
the costs of park physical maintenance and joint park activities. Let the total variable cost for a park of a given 
land size be: 
VC = c1N + c2N 
2
 (c1, c2 > 0) (3) 
The average cost function for the park (Fig. 3) is: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The marginal effect on average cost of admitting a new firm (Fig. 4) into the park is: 
 
For small values of N the marginal effect on average cost of admitting a new firm to the park is negative, but for 
large values of N it will be positive. Decreases in fixed cost cause the AC curve to shift downward, but from Eq. 
(5) it is clear that decreases in fixed cost cause the AC′ curve to shift upwards for all values of N. Also note that 
the AC′ curve is always rising with N: 
 
 
 
For a feasible private research park that has the potential to generate positive average net benefits for the firms, 
we assume the park‟s objective function is 
 
The first-order condition for this optimization problem is: 
 
As long as the AC′ curve intersects the AB′ curve from below, as in Figure 5, the value of N that satisfies the 
first-order condition will maximize the value of average net benefit. If firms were homogeneous in their ability 
to benefit from R&D collaboration each firm‟s benefit from joining the park would be the average benefit. With 
free entry into the park, firms would continue to enter until park members‟ average net benefit was driven down 
to zero. Figure 6 illustrates the free entry solution where the average cost curve intersects the average benefit 
curve from below. The equilibrium number of firms under free entry is denoted by Ne. Because the optimal 
number of firms (N*) by assumption generates a positive ANB, Ne > N*. A private research park will always 
seek to restrict the number of firms in the park below the free entry level. 
 
 
3 THE EFFECT OF UNIVERSITY AFFILIATION 
Universities provide a wealth of R&D infrastructure, knowledge, ability to synergize, etc. Within the context of 
the model above, the presence of a university increases the average benefits of R&D collaboration (AB) for any 
value of N, as shown in Figure 7. We assume it also increases the marginal effect AB′ for every value of N (Fig. 
8). 
 
University affiliation is assumed to reduce the fixed costs (F), borne by the research park members by making 
its infrastructure available to park members. University affiliation may also increase variable costs of park 
operations through agreements it makes with park firms, such as hiring a certain number of University students 
or graduates per year, etc. 
 
 
 
 
For simplicity, we assume that University affiliation may increase the parameter c1 in the variable cost function, 
VC = c1N + c2N
2
, but has no effect on the parameter c2. With these assumptions, university affiliation reduces 
members‟ average costs for small values of N (less than N), but increases it for larger values, as shown in Figure 
9. University affiliation, however, unambiguously shifts the AC′ function given by Eq. (5) upward for all values 
of N, as shown in Figure 10. 
 
 
 
 
 
Because university affiliation causes both the AB′ curve and the AC′ curve to shift upward, university affiliation 
has an ambiguous effect on the optimal number of park firms. Figure 11 illustrates the special case where the 
optimal number of firms remains unchanged by university affiliation. However, if the AB curve (AC curve) 
were to shift up by more than what is indicated in Figure 11, the optimal number of firms would rise (fall). 
 
Up until now we have assumed that the research park is economically feasible without university affiliation. 
Without university affiliation it is possible that the park‟s average cost curve lies everywhere above the average 
benefit curve. Because university affiliation raises the average benefit and lowers the average cost, university 
affiliation may be necessary for the existence of a research park. Obviously, in this important special case 
university affiliation increases the optimal park size. 
 
4 CONCLUSION 
In a model where the objective of a research park is to maximize the net average benefits of each member firm, 
the optimum number of firms is determined by the marginal effect that firm entry has on average member 
benefits and costs. We find that a private research park will always seek to limit the number of firms in the park 
to a smaller number than would occur if there were free entry into the park. We also find that university 
affiliation has an ambiguous effect on the optimal number of firms in the park. 
 
Notes: 
1 According to Link and Scott (2006), the term science park is more common in Europe and Asia and the term 
research park is more common in the United States. See Link and Scott (2003, 2006) for alternative definitions 
of a university research park. 
2 For support of these assertions about the economic role of a research park, see Link and Scott (2007). 
3 Link and Scott (2006), 44–45. 
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